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Abstract National Council of Real Estate Fiduciaries multiple listing
service level cash ﬂows and panels of capitalization rates for
industrial, ofﬁce and retail properties over the last two decades
are examined in this study. Real NOI 5-year future growth is
shown to be negatively related to deviations of current real NOI
from trend. Given this trend reversion in real cash ﬂows, investor
rationality requires that income multipliers be low (capitalization
rates be high) when real cash ﬂows are above trend and visa
versa. In the panel estimates, the opposite is seen to be the case.
Whether this is due to questionable data or irrational behavior is
uncertain.
Introduction
Capitalization rates should be linked to expected real cash ﬂow growth. The higher
is expected real growth, the more investors should be willing to pay for a current
dollar of cash ﬂow and thus the lower should the capitalization rate be. To
illustrate, when real rents are expected to rebound from a cycle bottom, investors
should be willing to pay relatively more for a dollar of current cash ﬂow—cap
rates should be low—than when only normal growth is expected.
Real property cash ﬂows per unit space have been shown to be mean reverting in
the United States (Wheaton and Torto, 1994), as well as in many other countries.1
As a result, when real cash ﬂows are highest relative to trend, investors should
expect negative (or at least below average) real cash ﬂow growth and cap rates
should therefore be relatively high.2 However, based on panel estimation of
NCREIF data, both Sivitanides, Southard, Torto and Wheaton (SSTW, 2001) and
Chen, Hudson-Wilson and Nordby (CHN, 2004) report negative relationships
between cap rates and the ratio of market to long run equilibrium real rents. SSTW
conclude that U.S. investors have not built the ‘‘obvious’’ mean reversion of real
rents into their forecasts of real rental growth and thus have overvalued property
at rental cyclical peaks (used too low cap rates) and undervalued it at cyclical
troughs.3446  Hendershott and MacGregor
These results contrast markedly with those of Hendershott and MacGregor (2005),
who ﬁnd that investors in the ofﬁce and retail markets in the United Kingdom
have appropriately built mean reversion into U.K. cap rates. The contrasting results
could be due to differences in modeling, in the quality of data, or in differences
in U.K. and U.S. investor behavior. Regarding modeling, Hendershott and
MacGregor found a strong link between property cap rates and the stock market
(both the dividend price ratio and proxies for the expected growth rate in real
dividends), a link not explored in the SSTW and CHN studies. As for data, two
weaknesses in the U.S. data analyses are noteworthy. First, the NCREIF cap rate
series are based, in part, on stale appraisals and, at certain times and places, on
very few properties. Second, the real net rental data employed in constructing
expected rental growth proxies are based on market rent (new leases) data rather
than actual property cash ﬂows.
The present paper takes another look at the NCREIF data, building different data
panels and using real NOI cash ﬂows. Stale appraisals are excluded in the
computation of cap rates, as are periods and/or MSAs from the panel estimation
when there are too few properties to give plausible NOI growth rates. Both
underlying NCREIF NOI data and market rents are used to compute proxies for
expected real NOI growth. Unfortunately, attempts to establish links to equity
market variables similar to those found for the U.K. market have been
unsuccessful and thus are not reported.
Section two describes the modeling framework and reviews the SSTW and CHN
methodologies and empirical results. Section three describes the NCREIF cap rate
and real NOI data used. There are serious concerns with the quality of the data.
The capitalization rates are extremely volatile, and numerous outlandishly large
(in absolute value) quarterly real NOI growth rates are observed. More speciﬁcally,
MSA property level data are especially worrisome prior to 1985 (industrial) or
1986 (retail and ofﬁce), owing largely to limited numbers of properties, and only
six retail and ofﬁce MSAs of plausible data quality even after 1985 can be
identiﬁed.
The mean reversion proxies employed are shown to be good predictors of future
real NOI growth in Section 4. The proxies are signiﬁcantly negatively correlated
with ex post ﬁve-year forward real NOI cash-ﬂow growth; the greater is current
real cash ﬂow relative to its mean, the lower was ex post future real cash-ﬂow
growth. That is, real cash ﬂows have been mean reverting. This result is similar
to that obtained with U.K. property data.
Section ﬁve reports results for the industrial, ofﬁce and retail markets. The results
are fully consistent with SSTW and CHN, suggesting that U.S. investors do not
appear to have built mean reversion into their forecasts of real cash ﬂow growth
and thus capitalization rates have been too low at rental peaks and too high at
rental troughs. Section 6 summarizes the ﬁndings.Investor Rationality: An Analysis of NCREIF  447
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 Modeling the Capitalization Rate
Value is the sum of all future discounted cash ﬂows. If real cash ﬂows are expected
to grow at a constant rate g forever, R is the (constant) required rate of return on
property, and leases are for single periods, then the ratio of next period’s real cash
ﬂow to value, the cap rate is:
C  R  g. (1)
With the required real return decomposed into the nominal 10-year Treasury rate,
R10, plus a risk premium, prem, less expected 10-year inﬂation, E(Inf10), then:
C  R10  prem  E(Inf10)  g. (2)
Of course, leases are longer than one period and rarely would one expect future
real discount rates and real cash ﬂow growth rates to be constant. Thus Equation
(2) is an approximation.
SSTW (2001) consider expectations of real cash ﬂow growth as consisting of both
extrapolative and regressive components. They base their expectations proxies on
Torto-Wheaton newly-let or market real net rent series on fully-occupied space
(see Wheaton and Torto, 1994, for a discussion of the calculation methodology).
Their speciﬁc proxies are the percentage change in real net market rent during the
previous year (%CFM) and the ratio of current (annual average) market real
market rent to its trend value (CFM/CFT):
g  g(%CFM, CFM/CFT). (3)
The greater is recent real growth, the higher is expected growth; the higher are
real rents relative to trend, the lower should be expected growth.
For ofﬁce and industrial properties, SSTW (2001) examine data from fourteen
metropolitan markets for the 1984–2000 period; for retail, their data are from nine
markets for the 1983–2000 period. Annual averages of quarterly data are
employed. Variations in the real discount rate are captured by the 10-year Treasury
bond rate and the previous year CPI inﬂation rate, which have positive and
negative effects. The log of the cap rate is treated as the dependent variable and
its lagged value is included as an independent variable to allow for a sluggish
response of the capitalization rate to its determinants.448  Hendershott and MacGregor
While the growth in real rent works as expected, the real net rent level variable
has a negative coefﬁcient, which is inconsistent with expectations of mean
reversion in real rents. This conclusion is tempered by two considerations. First,
the rent ratio is entered with a two-year lag. Rational forward-looking expectations
require that the current rent ratio, not the lagged ratio, have a positive coefﬁcient.
If, to illustrate, the rent cycle were four years, two rising and two falling, forward-
looking expectations would require that the lagged two-year ratio have a positive
coefﬁcient. Of course, the cycle is far longer than four years.
Second, it is the expected growth rate in actual real property cash ﬂows, rather
than in newly-let lease rates on fully let property, that is relevant to valuation.
Thus there are two potential real cash ﬂow adjustments, the movement of contract
real cash ﬂow to newly-let or market real cash ﬂow and the movement of real
market cash ﬂow to long-run equilibrium. To reﬂect this, consider:
  (4) g  g(%CF, CF/CFM, CFM/CFT),
where both of the level ratios should have negative impacts on the expected growth
rate and thus positive impacts on the cap rate.
In a more recent study, CHN (2004) also estimate panels explaining NCREIF
capitalization rates.4 Their estimation differs from SSTW (2001) in important
respects. First, they use PPR rather than TW real market rent indexes. Second,
they take Equation (2) quite literally, constraining the coefﬁcient on R10 to unity
by subtracting it from the right side, treating C-R10 as the dependent variable.
This greatly increases the importance of an accurate estimate of E(Inf10), but like
SSTW, they simply use the previous year CPI inﬂation rate. Third, they use
current, rather than lagged, values of the rent proxies.
Supporting the SSTW (2001) results, CHN (2004) report a negative relationship
between cap rates and the concurrent ratio of real market rent to its mean value.
Unfortunately, they interpret this variable as a determinant of the risk premium
required on real estate, not of the expected growth rate in real cash ﬂows. They
argue that lower premiums are required in ‘‘hot’’ markets (high CF/CFM) and
thus that the negative coefﬁcient is consistent with rationality. The current study
ﬁnds it implausible that a lower risk premium would rationally be required the
greater is the downside risk to real cash ﬂows (equities were less risky at the early
2000 peak than earlier?), much less that the magnitude of the premium impact
would be greater than the positive impact on the cap rate through a lower expected
real growth rate.Investor Rationality: An Analysis of NCREIF  449
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 NCREIF Data
The capitalization rates and real net rent or NOI series are both from the NCREIF
database and are discussed in detail below. To illustrate the construction of the
data, consider the following example. Say that for a particular geographic area
and property type there are thirty properties in quarter one and thirty-four in
quarter two. For each property there is an NOI and a value estimate. Of the thirty-
four properties in quarter two, twenty-eight are the same properties that existed
in quarter one; two had been sold and six new properties were added to the
database. Finally, say that only half of the properties had appraisals each quarter.
Cap rates are calculated as the ratio of the aggregate NOI for the newly appraised
properties to their aggregate appraised value. That is, to continue the example, in
quarter one the aggregations are over only the ﬁfteen properties with a ‘‘fresh’’
appraisal; in quarter two they are over only eighteen. The NOI index for quarter
two is computed by multiplying the beginning period index number, say 100 for
the ﬁrst quarter, by 1  g2, which is the ratio of the sum of the NOIs in quarter
two to the sum in quarter one (and equals one plus the growth rate). Both sums
are computed for the twenty-eight common properties in the two quarters.
Similarly, 1  g3 is calculated for quarter three by using the common properties
in quarters two and three. The NOI index for quarter three is then the product of
the quarter two index and 1  g3 (in the example it would be 100 (1  g2)
(1  g3)).
Capitalization Rates
Capitalization rates are computed as the ratio of a four-quarter average of
aggregate property NOIs to current appraised value. The NOI average is of current,
one future, and two lagged values. The averaging is necessary to smooth out the
accounting data, which are highly volatile. However, even cap rates based on the
smoothed NOI data are quite volatile, as shown below.
Unlike the SSTW (2001) and CHN (2004) studies, ‘‘stale’’appraisals (those where
there is no change in value and thus cap rates) have been excluded from the
database. This deletes about half of the properties in any quarter because properties
are appraised only twice a year on average.
The panels are determined in a multi-step process. First, the Investment Property
Databank rule that no MSA observation be based on fewer than four properties
and requiring that the panel not begin after 1984.1 is imposed. With these two
rules, only four cities for were obtained for retail (Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago
and LA) and seven cities for ofﬁce (Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Washington DC,
Los Angeles, Minneapolis and New York City). In order to achieve larger retail
and ofﬁce panels and to get greater numbers of properties generally, some common
or close MSAs have been aggregated. The aggregations are:450  Hendershott and MacGregor
Baltimore/DC (to get retail)
Kansas City/St. Louis (to get retail)
New York City/Newark
Northern CA: Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose and Vallejo (to get ofﬁce and
retail)
Phoenix/Tucson (to get retail).
Southern CA: Los Angeles, Orange County and Riverside
South Florida: Fort Lauderdale, Miami and West Palm Beach (to get ofﬁce)
Exhibit 1 lists the resulting fourteen cities (MSAs), the NCREIF codes for each,
the year the series begins and the local CPI index used to deﬂate the nominal
series. Industrial properties are most heavily represented in the NCREIF database
and there are twelve potential cities beginning in 1980 or 1982. There are nine
and eight potential cities for ofﬁce and retail, beginning in 1981–1983 and 1982–
1984, respectively. The term ‘‘potential’’ is used because the questionable quality
of the NOI data caused the deletion of some of these series from the panels.
Exhibit 2 lists the average number of properties for each property type in each
quarter. Two averages are computed, one for ‘‘early’’years and one for later years.
The breaks for the property types are: end 1985 (ofﬁce), end 1987 (industrial) and
end 1988 (retail). As can be seen, the early samples for ofﬁce and retail have only
nine properties on average, while that for industrial has twenty-two. There are
more than twice as many properties in ofﬁce and retail during the later years, with
only one category, KC/St.L retail, averaging less than twelve properties per
quarter. SSTW (2001) do not provide information on the number of properties in
their MSA level NCREIF data. In personal correspondence, CHN (2004) state that
they required a minimum of ten properties per observation when establishing their
panels.
 The Real NOI or Net Rent Data
The real rental (NOI) growth expectations variables (recent growth and the level
of real net NOI relative to trend) require the calculation of real NOI indices.
Nominal NOI indices are obtained by moving the initial index forward each
quarter by multiplying it by unity plus the nominal growth rate in NOI. As
explained above, for each MSA and property type, the NOI on all properties that
existed in each pair of adjacent quarters (and whose characteristics did not change
between the quarters) is aggregated and then the aggregate value in one quarter
is divided by the aggregate value in the previous quarter to obtain unity plus the
growth rate. The real net rent or NOI indices is obtained by deﬂating the nominal
series by the area-speciﬁc CPI indices (equal to 1 in 1982–1984).
These inﬂation series are obtained from www.econmagic.com. Series are available
for all but three of the areas. For DC/Baltimore, a series is available only after































































Exhibit 1  MSAs or Aggr
City MSAs
Initial Year
Industrial Ofﬁce Retail CPI Availability
Atlanta 520 80 84 Even months only
Boston 1123 82 83 Odd months only
Chicago 1600 80 81 84 All
Dallas 1920 80 83 Even until 98, then odd
Washington DC/Baltimore 8840720 80 81 82 Only available 97-03 (odd); use South Size A earlier)*
Kansas City/St. Louis 37607040 80 83 84 Use Midwest Size A; even only until 1987
Minneapolis 5120 80 81 Even only until 1986
New York City/Newark 56005640 83 All
Northern California 7360740087205775 80 82 82 Oakland, SF, SJ & Vallejo; all until 1998, then even only
Philadelphia 6160 82 All
Phoenix/Tucson 6200 80 82 Use West Size A; only even through 1986, then all
Seattle 7600 82 Only odd thru 1997; then only even
Southern California 448059456780 80 81 82 LA, Orange County, Riverside; all
Southern Florida 500089602689 84 Fort Lauderdale, Miami, WPB; only odd thru 1997; then only even
MSAs 12 9 8
Note:
aThe base for Washington DC in 1996  100, while South Size A it is the usual 1982–1984  100.452  Hendershott and MacGregor
Exhibit 2  Average Number of Properties Included in Cap Rate Series for Selected Subperiods
Industrial Ofﬁces Retail
Pre 1988 1989–2002 Pre 1986 1990–2002 Pre 1989 1990–2002
Atlanta 16 26 6 13
Boston 7 17 6 17
Chicago 43 56 10 27 11 20
Dallas 31 39 15 17
Washington DC/
Baltimore
10 29 12 48 8 18
Kansas City/St.
Louis
91 6 7 1 5 58






47 59 9 31 8 20
Philadelphia 7 15




49 110 12 30 14 34
Southern Florida 9 19
Average 22 36 9 23 9 18
Note: Averages computed from start dates of 1982 for industrial, 1983 for ofﬁce and 1984 for
retail.
series to equal the South Size A index in 1996.1. For KC/St.L, the Midwest Size
A is used for all quarters, and for Phoenix/Tucson, West Size A is used for all
quarters. For some series for some periods, the deﬂators are available only every
other month. The average of all months available is used in the relevant quarter
to obtain quarterly indexes.
The price level series rise at different rates, with the aggregate cumulative rise in
the price level between 1985.1 and 2003.1 ranging from a low of 65% to 68%
for Atlanta, Dallas, DC/Baltimore and KC/St.L to 82% to 84% in New York,
Northern CA and Seattle, and to 88% in Boston. That is, Boston experienced a
third more inﬂation than the ﬁrst set of cities, and New York City, Northern CA
and Seattle experienced a quarter more.Investor Rationality: An Analysis of NCREIF  453
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The underlying nominal NOI series exhibit extreme volatility, which generated an
exploration of the outliers. More speciﬁcally, the study examined quarterly
nominal NOI growth rates of greater than 25% in absolute value. While individual
properties might occasionally experience sharp changes in quarterly NOI owing
to the loss or gain of major tenants, averages of NOIs across eight to twenty-ﬁve
properties would seem unlikely to experience sharp changes. Nonetheless, forty-
eight quarters have negative growth rates greater than 25% and 113 quarters have
positive growth rates greater than 25%. This is 6.5% of the total sample. As one
might expect, there is a negative correlation between these outliers and the
following or preceding quarterly observations. This is obvious in the scatter
diagram of current nominal NOI growth against next period NOI growth in Exhibit
3, Panel A.
Exhibit 4 lists the number of outliers by city, property and magnitude. The
numbers with absolute values between 25% and 33.3%, 33.3% and 50%, 50%
and 100% and above 100% are listed. As can be seen in the average-per-MSA
row, outliers are 60% and 80% more likely for ofﬁce and retail than for industrial
(even though the industrial data start a year earlier than ofﬁce and two years earlier
than retail). Altogether, the outliers constitute 4% of the total industrial quarters
and 8% each of the ofﬁce and retail quarters. Moreover, 1.5% of the total retail
and ofﬁce quarters have growth rates greater than 50% in absolute value, and all
four of the over 100% absolute rental changes and three-quarters of changes
between 75% and 100% are in ofﬁce or retail.
Because the numbers of properties in retail and ofﬁce are less than half as many
as those in industrial, this suggests, as expected, that outliers are concentrated in
periods/MSAs where there are relatively fewer properties. To check this, Exhibit
5 shows the cumulative percentage of quarters in the total sample with numbers
of properties less than different thresholds, as well as the percentage of outliers
of different magnitudes with similar numbers.5 As can be seen, only 20% of the
total sample quarters have fewer properties than ten, while 37% to 75% of the
outliers do, with the percentage rising with the size of the outlier. And while 75%
of the total sample quarters have less than thirty properties, 95% of the outlier
quarters do.
The outliers are also twice as likely to occur in the early years of the sample
when the numbers of properties per quarter are relatively fewer. Forty-three
percent (20 of 47) of the industrial outliers occur before 1985 or in the ﬁrst 19%
of the sample. Similarly, 44% of ofﬁce outliers occur in the earliest 18% of the
observations, and 26% of retail outliers occur in the earliest 14% of the
observations.
This concentration in early quarters suggested that the panels begin later than that
dictated by the four-property rule. The industrial panel begins in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1985 and the retail and ofﬁce panels in the ﬁrst quarter of 1986. That is, the
industrial, ofﬁce and retail panels begin one, two and three years later than SSTW454  Hendershott and MacGregor
Exhibit 3  Nominal NOI Percentage Change: Current Quarter versus Next Quarter
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Exhibit 4  Number of Quarters with Absolute Values of Percentage Change in Nominal NOI Growth within Indicated Ranges
Absolute Values
Range
25 to 33 33 to 50 50 to 100 100 Total
IO RIO RI O R I O R I O R
Atlanta 520 2 3 1 4 0 1 0 1 3 9
Boston 1123 4 5 2 3 3 0 0 0 9 8
Chicago 1600 1 4 4232 12 1 0 1 04 1 0 7
Dallas 1920 0 3 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 9
Kansas City/St Louis 3760 2 2 2132 15 0 0 0 04 1 0 4
S. California 4480 0 2 1011 01 0 0 0 00 4 2
S. Florida 5000 3 3 0 0 6
Minneapolis 5120 3 2 2 4 0 2 0 0 5 8
New York City/Newark 5600 1 2 0 0 3
Philadelphia 6160 2 1 1 0 4
Phoenix/Tucson 6200 4 3 3 5 0 0 0 1 7 9
N. California 7360 0 4 6111 01 1 0 1 01 7 8
Seattle 7600 3 0 0 0 3
Washington DC/Baltimore 8840 3 4 2411 00 2 0 0 07 5 5
Total 24 27 24 17 22 19 6 13 5 0 2 2 47 64 50
Average per MSA 3.9 7.1 6.25
Note: Based on data from the start dates shown in Exhibit 1 until 2003.1.456  Hendershott and MacGregor
Exhibit 5  Cumulative Percentage of Quarterly Nominal NOI Growth in Speciﬁed Ranges by Number of
Properties Used in Calculation
Number of Properties 10 15 20 30 200
Number of
Observations
Percentage of total sample 20 40 57 75 100 2511
Observations with absolute value:
25% to 33.3% 37 67 84 95 100 75
33.3% to 50% 45 84 91 93 100 58
50% to 100% 63 83 92 96 100 24
100% 75 75 75 100 100 4
Note: Based on Exhibit 1 starting dates.
(2001). Even with this later start, a number of MSAs continue to have outliers
(over ﬁve). As a result, two or three MSAs have been dropped from each panel.
Boston and Phoenix/Tucson have been deleted from the industrial panel, leaving
ten MSAs. Dallas, Minneapolis and Northern CA have been deleted from the
ofﬁce panel, leaving six MSAs, and Atlanta and Phoenix/Tucson have been
deleted from the retail panel, again leaving six MSAs.
Exhibit 6 shows that dropping a few MSAs and starting the panels a bit later
eliminates all the outliers with growth rates over 100% in absolute value, 88% of
the outliers between 50% and 100%, 78% of those between 33.3% and 50%, and
61% of those with absolute growth rates between 25% and 33.3%. In Exhibit 3,
Panel B is the scatter diagram of current nominal NOI growth against next period
NOI growth for the remaining data. A simple correlation of the current and next
period changes in nominal NOI growth in these data is 0.42.
The main difference in the ﬁnal panels from those of SSTW (2001) is that they
include Denver and Houston in their ofﬁce and industrial panels, while in this
study, Seattle is included in the industrial panel and South Florida in the retail
panel. Further, they include Washington DC, New York City, Oakland, Los
Angeles and Orange County separately, while they are aggregated in this study,
respectively, with Baltimore, Newark, San Francisco–San Jose–Vallejo (into
Northern CA) and Orange County–Riverside (into Southern CA).
 The Resulting Data
Exhibit 7 plots the ofﬁce cap rates. These rates declined modestly throughout most
of the 1980s, troughing in 1990 or early 1991. They then rose by two to three































































Exhibit 6  Number of Quarters with Absolute Values of Percentage Change in Nominal NOI within Indicated Ranges–Revised Sample
Absolute Values
Range 0.25 to 0.33 0.33 to 0.5 0.5 to 1 1 Total
IO R IO R IO R IO R I OR
Atlanta 520 2 1 0 0 3 0
Boston 1123 0 0 0 0 0
Chicago 1600 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 2
Dallas 1920 0 0 0 0 0
Kansas City/St Louis 3760 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 4
S. California 4480 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
S. Florida 5000 2200 4
Minneapolis 5120 0 0 0 0 0
New York City/Newark 5600 1 1 0 0 2
Philadelphia 6160 1 0 0 0 1
Phoenix/Tucson 6200
N. California 7360 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 5
Seattle 7600 1 0 0 0 1
Washington DC/Baltimore 8840 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2
Total 9 8 12 4 4 5 1 0 2 0 0 0 14 12 19
Note: Industrials start in 1985; Ofﬁce and Retail in 1986.458  Hendershott and MacGregor
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all then declined through 1998 (Washington DC/Baltimore and KC/St.L being
the exceptions). After that point most remained roughly ﬂat, although Boston and
Chicago rose by a percentage point or two.
The retail cap rates are in Exhibit 8. While volatile, the cap rates for the four
cities in Panel A exhibit common movement. Rates declined by one to two
percentage points in the 1980s, and then rose by two to three percentage points
in the 1990s, with most of the rise occurring in the ﬁrst half of the decade. Cap
rates are even more volatile in the four cities in Panel B, with little evidence of
a trend decline in the 1980s. There is a common sharp rise in the ﬁrst half of the
1990s, but a roughly two percentage point decline in the late 1990s. Cap rates in
KC/St.L and South Florida reversed sharply in 1999–2000.
The industrial cap rates are in Exhibit 9. The rates for most cities—those in Panel
A—are roughly ﬂat from 1981 to 1991 at 7.5% to 8%, jump in the next two
years, and are then ﬂat for the 1993–2002 period at 9% to 9.5%. The exceptions
are Chicago, Washington DC/Baltimore and Seattle, where the rates are relatively
stable throughout the entire twenty-year period.460  Hendershott and MacGregor
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Northern California462  Hendershott and MacGregor
Exhibits 10–12 plot the real NOI series for the MSAs and years in the ﬁnal data
set. Of the six ofﬁce MSAs, all experienced a 25% to 50% decline in real NOI
through the middle 1990s and then all except Boston reversed and recovered most
of the loss. Boston real rents initially declined by 50%, falling all the way through
1997, and were then ﬂat.
In contrast to real ofﬁce NOIs, real retail NOIs neither fell sharply in the late
1980s and ﬁrst half of the 1990s nor rebounded after that, with two exceptions:
KC/St.L and Northern CA real NOIs did decline by 30% in the late 1980s and
stayed at that lower level, but Washington DC/Baltimore and Chicago both
experienced 25% to 40% real increases over the entire period; Southern CA and
South Florida were basically ﬂat. While all real retail NOI series are volatile, the
California series are particularly so.
Most industrial real rent series declined by 20% to 50% from the mid 1980s
through 1993 or 1994. Exceptions are Washington DC/Baltimore, KC/St.L,
Minneapolis and Southern CA, where real NOIs were basically ﬂat (KC/St.L had
a 1985–1988 blip and then reversal). The largest declines were for Dallas and
Philadelphia. After 1993–1994, real NOIs in six of the ten MSAs were roughly
ﬂat through 2002. Washington DC/Baltimore and Northern CA experienced huge
increases (60% to 100%), while Chicago, Minneapolis and KC/St.L had about
30% declines. In 2002, real industrial NOIs were 30% to 50% below their
mid1980s levels in all cities except Washington DC/Baltimore and Southern CA.
The former were ﬂat, while the latter were 50% higher.
Exhibit 13 reports both the correlations between the real NOI series reported here
and the comparable Torto-Wheaton rent series and the ratios of their standard
deviations (in parentheses). The series are for the 1985.1 (industrial) or 1986.1
(ofﬁce and retail) to 2002.4 period. There are two obvious reasons for the NCREIF
and TW series to move differently. First, the NOIs refer to cash ﬂows from sitting
tenants while the TW series represent newly-written leases or market rents on
fully occupied properties. Second, in some cases the aggregated MSAs have been
aggregated (e.g., Washington DC and Baltimore), while in the TW series they
were not.
Half the ofﬁce correlations are 0.8 or higher, and the modest Kansas City
correlation can be explained by including St. Louis. Half the industrial correlations
are 0.7 or higher, and the ‘‘zero’’ Washington DC and Kansas City correlations
are at least partially explained by MSA coverage differences. Nonetheless, there
are some surprising low correlations caused by rather fundamentally different
movements in the series. To illustrate, the low Boston ofﬁce correlation reﬂects a
33% decline in the NCREIF series between 1992 and 2000 versus a 70% rise in
the TW series. And the negative correlations for Chicago (0.33) and DC (0.52)
retail are due to sharp divergences in the series in the 1988–1994 period. In
Chicago, NCREIF NOI was ﬂat, while TW rent fell by 20%, and in Washington
DC (and Baltimore), NCREIF NOI rose by 40% versus a 30% decline in the TW
data.Investor Rationality: An Analysis of NCREIF  463
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Despite dropping the MSAs with the most volatile real NOI growth and data from
the more volatile early years, an overriding concern is the substantial volatility
still remaining. On average, the standard deviations of the ofﬁce and industrial
real NOI series are 4.5 times greater than those of the TW real rent series.6 The
standard deviation for the retail sector is 11 times greater (TW interpolated annual
data to obtain quarterly rent series). While the NCREIF NOI data would be
expected to be more volatile owing to changes in occupancy rates, rental rates on
existing contracts should move sluggishly relative to those on new contracts.
Simply put, the volatility in these real NOI series stretches credibility. And this
volatility is undoubted a source of the volatility in the capitalization rates.
The Validity of the Mean or Trend Reversion Proxies
The validity of the mean or trend reversion proxies for the expected rate of growth
in real NOI is examined by correlating actual real NOI growth over the next ﬁve
years with two measures of the divergence of real NOIs from trend values. TheInvestor Rationality: An Analysis of NCREIF  467
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Exhibit 13  Correlation of NCREIF Real NOI Levels with TW Real Rent Levels and Ratio of Standard










Washington DC/Baltimore 0.85 0.52 0.11
(2.2) (6.0) (4.9)














Note: Estimation for Industrials: 85.1-03.1; Retail and Ofﬁces 86.1-03.1.
two measures are the log deviation of real NOI from its trend value and the ratio
of real NOI to its mean. The correlations are for 1986.1–1998.1 (the last ﬁve years
of observations are lost because ﬁve years of future cash ﬂows are needed). A
negative correlation is expected: the more positive is the deviation or the ratio,
the lower should future growth be.
The results are in Exhibit 14. The correlations are strongly negative, and they are
similar for the two measures of divergence. The average correlation coefﬁcient for
the property types (average of six MSAs for ofﬁces and retail and ten for
industrial) are listed at the bottoms of the panels. The strongest mean negative
correlation is 0.71 for ofﬁces; the correlations are about 0.6 for retail and
industrial. While these correlations are lower in absolute value than the 0.87468  Hendershott and MacGregor
Exhibit 14  Correlation of Proxies for Expected Real NOI Growth with





Washington DC/Baltimore 0.94 0.91
Kansas City/St Louis 0.44 0.44
New York City 0.80 0.86




Washington DC/Baltimore 0.68 0.83
Kansas City/St. Louis 0.64 0.58
Northern California 0.45 0.52
Southern California 0.75 0.72






Washington DC/Baltimore 0.73 0.42
Kansas City/St. Louis 0.40 0.24
Minneapolis 0.57 0.08
Northern California 0.84 0.77
Philadelphia 0.90 0.87
Seattle 0.43 0.05
Southern California 0.92 0.92
Average 0.61 0.51
Notes: The period for Industrials is 85.4-98.1, for Ofﬁces is 86.4-98.1 and for Retail is 87.4-98.1
(as full Southern Florida data start in 87.1). Four quarters are needed to start the moving
averages and ﬁve years at the end for the ﬁve-year actual future NOI. The ratio of real NOI to its
mean is for the maximum period possible (as in the regressions).
aRES is a four-quarter moving average of the residual from a regression of the log of real NCREIF
NOI on a time trend. NOI/NOI mean is also a four-quarter moving average.Investor Rationality: An Analysis of NCREIF  469
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Exhibit 15  Coefﬁcients from the Panel for Capitalization Rate Regressions
Ofﬁce Retail Industrial
%NOI 0.026 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.041 0.018
2.7 1.5 0.3 1.4 6.0 4.7
NOI/TW 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001
2.1 0.3 2.2 0.8 7.4 2.9
TW/TW mean 0.026 0.006 0.039 0.008 0.034 0.008
11.2 4.0 6.4 2.9 19.3 6.7
Cap rate (1) 0.782 0.883 0.801
25.7 41.4 38.9
Adj. R2 0.374 0.771 0.293 0.872 0.413 0.818
Notes: All cash ﬂow variables are real and are four-quarter moving averages. Values in italics are
t-Statistics. Estimation for Industrials: 85.4-02.4 and for Retail and Ofﬁces 86.4-02.4 (except
Southern Florida Retail, which is 87.4-02.4).
Hendershott and MacGregor (2005) found for U.K. ofﬁce and retail, the NCREIF
NOI data are far more volatile than the Hillier-Parker U.K. data the latter
employed and thus lower correlations are to be expected.
Capitalization Rate Results
The empirical results for the capitalization rates are fully consistent with SSTW
(2001) and CHN (2004). Exhibit 15 contains the estimated coefﬁcients on the
three proxies for expected real cash-ﬂow growth rate in Equation (2) for two
different equations for each of the three property types. The difference between
the equations is that the lagged capitalization rate has been added to the other
variables in the second estimation. A number of variants of these equations have
been estimated, but the basic story remains the same and thus are not reported
here.7 Varying MSA-speciﬁc intercepts (ﬁxed effects) are estimated.
In all except one equation, the recent growth variable enters positively, and the
TW mean reversion variable enters negatively in all equations. And the mean
reversion coefﬁcients, in particular, are highly signiﬁcant. These signs are, of
course, inconsistent with rationality. More rapid recent growth should cause
expectations of higher future growth and thus lower cap rates, and real cash ﬂows
above their long run value should lead to expectations of slower future real growth
and thus to higher cap rates. In addition, the ratio of existing contract rents (NOI)
to new contract (market) rents has a statistically signiﬁcant negative impact in the
ofﬁce and industrial equations. Again, this is inconsistent with rationality; contract
rents above market rents should generate expectations of lower cash ﬂow growth
and thus lead to higher capitalization rates. This is particularly disappointing as,470  Hendershott and MacGregor
Exhibit 16  Panel Regression of NCREIF Cap Rates on Actual Five-Year Forward
Real NOI Quarterly Growth Rates







Notes: t-Statistics are in italics. Industrials: 85.1-98.1; Ofﬁces and Retail 86.1-98.1. The constant
varies by MSA.
as was shown above, there are good proxies for future real cash-ﬂow growth. It
would appear that the market is not using this information to rationally price
property.
Finally, panel regressions of capitalization rates are run on actual future ﬁve-year
real NOI growth over the 1986.1–1998.1 period. The higher is ex post real growth,
the greater should expected growth have been and thus the lower should the
capitalization rate be. The results are in Exhibit 16 for the three property types.
Rather than negative, the coefﬁcients are positive and the t-ratios range from 6 to
10. That is, capitalization rates are higher the faster future rental growth will be;
investors pay less for a dollar of cash ﬂow when that ﬂow is going to increase
than they pay when the ﬂow is expected to erode. Again, irrationality is implied
by the data.
To summarize, there is minimal evidence that investors rationally expect the
reversion of real cash ﬂows to either current market rents or to long run
equilibrium rents. In fact, the greater the gap between current real cash ﬂows and
their market or equilibrium values, the greater do investors seem to expect the
gap to get.
 Conclusion
Given the conﬂicting evidence that U.K. investors have rationally built mean or
tread reversion into their forecasts of real cash ﬂows and thus property prices
(Hendershott and MacGregor, 2005) but U.S. investors have not (SSTW, 2001),
this paper has investigated carefully constructed U.S. NCREIF data using the
methodology we applied to the U.K. data. The ﬁndings indicate supposedly better
capitalization rates by deleting properties based on stale appraisals from the
calculations. And expected real cash ﬂow growth is proxied by gaps betweenInvestor Rationality: An Analysis of NCREIF  471
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actual property NOI data and Torto-Wheaton market rent data, as well as between
the TW market data and mean or trend real rents. Because early MSA level NOI
data are based on so few properties and are so volatile, the study was restricted
(and others should do likewise) to industrial data after 1984 and to retail and
ofﬁce data after 1985. Even so, panels can be formed of only six retail and ofﬁce
MSAs with plausible real NOI data, and this requires aggregating a number of
MSAs in close geographic proximity.
Nonetheless, the SSTW (2001) results stand. Based on this NCREIF data, U.S.
investors behaved irrationally in that they did not factor expectations of mean or
trend reversion of real cash ﬂows into their asset pricing (as reﬂected in
capitalization rates). In fact, investors appear to pay more for a dollar of cash ﬂow
when that ﬂow is rationally expected to erode in the future than they pay when
the ﬂow is rationally expected to increase.
And this result is not due to an inadequacy of the mean or trend reversion
expectations proxies. Actual real NOI growth over the next ﬁve years is strongly
negatively correlated with the two measures of the divergence of real NOIs from
trend values (just as was the case with the U.K. data). Further, panel regressions
of current NOI capitalization rates on actual real NOI growth over the next ﬁve
years yield positive coefﬁcients. That is, the higher is future real cash ﬂow growth,
the higher are capitalization rates (the lower are asset prices).
It is sometimes said that a picture is worth a thousand words, so four pictures for
southern California (Exhibit 17) and Chicago (Exhibit 18) (one each for ofﬁce
and industrial) are presented. These ﬁgures plot NCREIF capitalization rates
against the deviations of real NOI from trend. Rationality suggests a positive
relation. That is, the further real NOI is above trend, the less rapidly should it be
expected to grow and thus the less someone should be willing to pay for a dollar
of it (the higher should capitalization rates be).
Exhibit 17 illustrates the overall inconsistency of the data with rationality for
Southern CA. The relation is consistently negative, not positive. Exhibit 18 for
Chicago provides a modicum of hope for rationality. While the series are
negatively correlated between 1985 and 1992 or 1993, they are positively
(especially industrials) correlated after that. Perhaps the late 1980s and early 1990s
cycle taught Chicago investors about mean reversion.472  Hendershott and MacGregor
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 Endnotes
1 See Hendershott (1996) on Australia and Hendershott and MacGregor (2005) on the U.K.
2 More generally, how real cash ﬂow growth expectations are formed is crucial to the
rationality of any market. For a discussion of the U.S. equity market in this context, see
Hall (2001).
3 Valuation is also believed to have been too high at the peak of the late 1980s/early 1990s
cycle in Australia (Hendershott, 1996, 2000), Sweden (Bjorklund and Soderberg, 1999)
and some Asian cities (Quigley, 1999).
4 CHN (2004) also analyze an ofﬁce panel of fourteen MSAs, thirteen of which are the
same as (or quite similar to) those of Sivitanides, Southard, Torto and Wheaton (2001);
they use data for the 1982–2002 period.
5 The numbers of properties refer to those used in computing the capitalization rates, not
the NOI growth rates. Because all properties, not just those with current appraisals, were
used in computing the NOI series, the numbers of properties used in the NOI calculations
are roughly twice those discussed in the text.
6 The TW standard deviation for Seattle industrials is 2.5 times greater than that of any
other MSA.
7 As noted above, links to the stock market were tested. The stock market variables always
enter with unexpected signs and sometimes signiﬁcantly. Thus they have not been
included in the reported estimations.
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